The ancient Greeks gave us the neat trio: idiotēs (the private, apolitical “idiot”), the tribesman (one who places kin or group above common good), and the citizen (the civic-minded participant). That taxonomy is more than a philosophical curiosity — in Nigeria today it reads like a diagnostic manual for what ails our democracy. To understand why our democratic experiment keeps stalling, we must translate those three categories into contemporary Nigerian actions: indifference that looks like apathy, identity-first politics that looks like tribalism, and the rarer practice of genuine civic responsibility.
1) The “Idiot”: private life mistaken for public life
In classical terms the “idiot” was not stupid — they were disengaged. In modern Nigeria the equivalent is the person who treats politics as a spectator sport or a side hustle. With rising costs and daily survival pressures, many citizens prioritize immediate private needs over public action: they skip elections, sell votes, or accept patronage that makes them dependent on a politician rather than on institutions. This withdrawal corrodes public accountability and hands the public realm to those who do participate — often for private gain. Recent post-election monitors and civil-society assessments show vote-buying remains widespread in state contests, a symptom of private survival logic overwhelming civic duty.
2) The “Tribesman”: identity as the default political currency
Tribal or ethnic solidarity is, in many ways, a survival mechanism in a diverse nation. But when tribalism becomes the primary heuristic for political choice, it undermines programmatic politics. Politicians weaponize ethnic loyalties and deploy patronage networks — effectively converting group allegiance into political capital. The consequences are predictable: public resources redistributed along kinship lines, leadership chosen for identity loyalty rather than competence, and policy vacuums where long-term public goods should stand. Separatist agitations and regional tensions — and the government and judicial responses they prompt — show how identity-based politics can evolve into national security problems when grievances go unaddressed.
3) The Citizen: the missing yet essential actor
By contrast, the citizen engages beyond self and kin; they demand transparency, defend institutions, and participate in collective problem solving. Nigeria has pockets of robust citizenship — civil-society coalitions, investigative journalists, pro-democracy protests and youth networks that sustained #EndSARS and continued to press for accountability. But those actors are unevenly distributed and often outmatched by well-funded political machines. Strengthening citizenship means creating incentives for public participation (strong institutions, civic education, anti-corruption enforcement) and disincentives for clientelism.
Why the Greek taxonomy fits Nigeria — and why it matters now
This framework matters because it converts abstract malaise into three solvable problems. If we have too many “idiots,” we face an apathy crisis; too many “tribesmen” yields fragmented governance and zero-sum politics; too few “citizens” means weak demand for rule of law and accountability. Recent episodes show all three at work: enduring corruption and public distrust of institutions, violent and identity-driven conflicts, and persistent vote-buying that treats ballots as commodities rather than instruments of democratic choice. These are not separate crises but interacting pathologies: vote-buying feeds tribal solidarity; tribalism erodes civic trust; civic apathy allows corruption to thrive.
Practical fixes — moving from diagnosis to reform
1. Civic education at scale. The “idiot” is often the uninformed or the overwhelmed. National curricula, mass-media campaigns, and community-level forums can reframe political participation as a means to social improvement, not just a ritual.
2. Electoral integrity and enforcement. Stronger enforcement against vote-buying and swift prosecution of electoral crimes will raise the cost of transactional politics. Recent civil-society calls after state elections underline how critical this is.
3. Institutionalization of merit and transparency. Appointments, procurement and service delivery must be depersonalized. When institutions reward competence rather than loyalty, citizens get better services and politicians get fewer rent-seeking opportunities.
4. Depoliticize identity by expanding cross-cutting coalitions. Political parties and movements that build policy platforms across ethnic lines can blunt the pull of tribes-based voting. Deliberative spaces where diverse groups work on shared problems (infrastructure, power, health) reduce the salience of identity.
5. Economic interventions that reduce immediacy of patronage. When citizens are less desperate, they are less likely to sell their vote. Macroeconomic policies and targeted social safety nets matter politically as much as economically. Research shows corruption and economic stress feed one another; tackling both reduces the market for clientelism.
Closing: democracy as practice, not label
If democracy becomes merely a label on ballot day, the winners will be whoever best manipulates identity and private incentives. The Greek triad reminds us that the health of democracy is proportional to how many citizens we have versus tribesmen and idiots. Nigeria’s immediate political choices — strengthening electoral enforcement, protecting civic spaces, and building cross-ethnic public goods — can shift that balance. Turning voters into citizens is not sentimental; it is pragmatic. It is the only way to replace short-term patronage with long-term governance, and to ensure that democracy in Nigeria stops being a marketplace and becomes, finally, a mechanism for collective flourishing.
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