Ticker

6/recent/ticker-posts

Ad Code

Responsive Advertisement

Forget 36 States: Abuja Is Cooking 17 Regions — And FAAC May Be the First Casualty

Nigeria’s Quiet Abuja Restructuring Talks: 17 Regions, Resource Control and the Possible End of the Current System

There is currently a major conversation taking place in Abuja that has received relatively little attention in the wider public space, despite the potentially far-reaching implications it could have for the future political structure of Nigeria.

At the centre of the discussion is a proposal to fundamentally restructure Nigeria into 17 autonomous federated regions, with substantially greater powers over their internal affairs, resources, security and development.

The proposal emerged from a three-day deliberation of the Concerned Citizens Assembly in Abuja in August 2026. The group called for Nigeria to be reorganised into 17 autonomous regions and proposed that the regions retain 80 per cent of revenues generated within their territories, with the remaining 20 per cent going to the Federal Government.

That would represent a dramatic departure from Nigeria's current revenue-sharing arrangement through the Federation Account Allocation Committee (FAAC), under which revenues are distributed among the Federal Government, states and local governments.

Under the proposed arrangement, the regions would be expected to become considerably more economically self-sufficient, relying more heavily on resources generated within their territories while contributing to the maintenance of the central government.

One of the most interesting—and potentially controversial—aspects of the proposal is the question of identity, language and cultural affinity.

The 17 regions proposed by the assembly are Akwa Ibom, Ane Igala, Apa-Agba, Bendel, Caliphate, Cross River, Gurara, Hausa, Igbo, Ijaw, Kanem, Lower Benue, Niger, Plateau, Savannah and Yoruba, alongside Rivers. The assembly says boundaries should ultimately be determined by factors including consent, geographical contiguity, economic viability and cultural affinity, rather than political pressure or numerical strength.

This is where the restructuring conversation becomes particularly fascinating.

For example, the proposed Yoruba Region could potentially extend beyond the existing boundaries of the South-West geopolitical zone. Yoruba-speaking communities in parts of Kwara and Kogi, including the Okun-speaking areas of Kogi, could potentially find themselves aligned with a wider Yoruba regional structure if such a system is eventually negotiated and constitutionally adopted.

There are also significant questions surrounding the South-South and South-East.

The position of Ijaw communities and other groups in the Niger Delta could become particularly important because access to waterways, ports, oil-producing areas and other economic assets would have major implications under a resource-control model.

For the South-East, one of the concerns that could emerge from a restructuring based heavily on territorial and cultural identities is the question of access to the sea. A standalone Igbo region, depending on the final boundaries, could be geographically constrained and would potentially depend heavily on neighbouring regions, including Rivers and Lagos, for access to major maritime infrastructure.

There are also debates over communities such as the Awori in Lagos. Some arguments seek to emphasise their distinct identity, while others maintain that the Awori are a Yoruba-speaking group and should therefore remain within a broader Yoruba regional arrangement. Such questions demonstrate why the assembly itself has cautioned that regional boundaries cannot simply be imposed according to political calculations.

The proposal also envisages substantial regional control over security. This comes at a time when Nigeria is already moving towards decentralising policing. The National Assembly has advanced constitutional amendments to establish state police, with the Senate passing its state-police bill in June 2026.

If regional government eventually replaces the current structure, policing could therefore become even more decentralised, with regions taking responsibility for security and internal administration while the Federal Government retains clearly defined national responsibilities.

However, it is important to emphasise that Nigeria has not yet officially adopted a 17-region system.

The Abuja proposal is part of the wider restructuring debate. It is not, at this stage, a constitutional arrangement that automatically takes effect in 2031. The assembly itself is calling for a National Rebirth Commission and a new constitutional framework to negotiate and implement the proposed changes.

Still, the significance of the conversation should not be underestimated.

For decades, Nigerians have debated whether the country is too centralised and whether more powers and resources should be transferred from Abuja to the constituent parts of the federation.

The latest proposal takes that argument several steps further.

If eventually adopted, it could fundamentally alter how Nigeria is governed, how resources are controlled, how security is administered and even how Nigerians define their political regions.

The bigger question, therefore, may no longer simply be whether Nigeria should be restructured.

It may soon become a question of what Nigeria will actually look like after restructuring—and who gets to decide where the new boundaries will be drawn.

Post a Comment

0 Comments