Saudi Arabia is facing an increasingly complicated security crisis as the Iran-aligned Houthi movement expands its military pressure along Yemen’s Red Sea coast and threatens routes that are strategically important to the Kingdom’s energy exports.
One of the central arguments emerging from the crisis is that Riyadh did not join the Abraham Accords, despite years of discussions about possible Saudi-Israeli normalisation and closer U.S.-Saudi security cooperation. Instead, Saudi Arabia recently entered the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement with Türkiye and Pakistan, creating another framework for regional security cooperation. The agreement states that an armed attack against one of the three countries is to be regarded as an attack against all three.
The present crisis is now testing how those security arrangements work in practice.
The strategic concern goes beyond Saudi territory. Iran and its regional allies have the potential to exert pressure on two critical maritime energy corridors: the Strait of Hormuz to the east and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait to the west. The Strait of Hormuz is essential to Gulf oil exports, while Bab el-Mandeb connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and provides an important route for shipments travelling toward Europe.
The Houthi advance toward the Red Sea has therefore created an additional vulnerability for Riyadh. The group has seized strategically important positions, including areas around the Bab el-Mandeb, while continuing missile and drone attacks against Saudi targets.
Saudi Arabia’s energy infrastructure has also come under pressure. On September 10, multiple attacks struck the Kingdom’s East-West Pipeline in the Riyadh and Madinah regions. Saudi authorities subsequently shut the 1,200-kilometre pipeline as a precaution. Importantly, Saudi authorities and other reporting have linked those particular attacks to drones originating from Iraq; they have not been conclusively attributed to the Houthis themselves. Several people were injured.
The pipeline is particularly important because it allows Saudi crude from the eastern oil fields to reach the Red Sea while bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. Reuters reported that the pipeline has been carrying roughly 4–5 million barrels of oil per day during the current crisis.
The disruption has already affected global oil markets. Brent crude rose above $107 per barrel and briefly approached $110, reflecting concerns about the security of Middle Eastern supply routes.
There is, however, an important correction to the claim that the attacks have killed 73 people. Available reporting says 73 civilians were wounded, including women and children, in Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia; the figure should not be described as 73 deaths.
The Makkah defence agreement is also more substantial than simply a statement of solidarity. It formally establishes a collective-defence principle and provides for enhanced defence cooperation, although its practical response to the current Houthi offensive remains an open question.
That question became more significant after Riyadh sought direct U.S. military intervention. According to Reuters, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman asked President Donald Trump for assistance against the Houthis, but Washington declined to launch direct strikes while offering intelligence-sharing and targeting support instead.
The reason for Washington's decision has not been officially attributed to Saudi Arabia's choice of the Makkah pact over the Abraham Accords. It would therefore be speculative to conclude that Trump rejected military action because of that decision. What is documented is that the Trump administration has prioritised avoiding another direct military front while concentrating U.S. resources on the wider conflict involving Iran.
Meanwhile, reports indicate that Saudi Arabia has also explored intelligence cooperation with Israel through U.S. Central Command. Regional diplomatic and security sources cited by Israeli media say discussions have focused on intelligence assistance against the Houthis.
The developing situation leaves Saudi Arabia confronting an uncomfortable strategic reality: its security partnerships are being tested simultaneously, while the vulnerability of its energy infrastructure and access to the Red Sea demonstrate how quickly developments in Yemen, Iraq, Iran and the Gulf can become interconnected.
The crisis is therefore no longer simply about the Houthi conflict in Yemen. It has evolved into a wider contest over energy security, maritime chokepoints, regional alliances and the limits of external military support.
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