With or without Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s fundamental security objectives are unlikely to change significantly. The bigger question is how aggressively those objectives would be pursued if Netanyahu loses power.
Israel’s war objectives following the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack have centred on preventing another such assault, dismantling Hamas’s military and governing capabilities, securing the release of hostages and establishing a security arrangement that would prevent Gaza from again becoming a base for attacks against Israel.
That means removing Netanyahu from office would not automatically mean abandoning those objectives. Netanyahu may be the most recognisable face of Israel’s wartime leadership, but the country’s security establishment, military and political institutions extend far beyond one prime minister.
In fact, there is an argument that a post-Netanyahu government could pursue some of the same objectives with even greater determination.
Netanyahu has faced intense criticism from Israelis over his handling of the war, the October 7 security failures, the hostage crisis and the length of the conflict. But opposition to Netanyahu should not automatically be interpreted as opposition to Israel’s military objectives. Recent reporting ahead of Israel’s October 27, 2026 election indicates that leading challengers, including former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and former military chief Gadi Eisenkot, remain hard-line on major security questions.
This is where the argument becomes particularly interesting.
Bibi losing power may not necessarily be good news for Israel’s enemies.
Naftali Bennett, one of Netanyahu’s major political challengers, has adopted an especially confrontational position toward Qatar because of its relationship with Hamas. Bennett has vowed to designate Qatar an “enemy state,” accusing Doha of hosting Hamas leaders and supporting the organisation. He has also argued that Qatar represents a serious threat to Israel.
Bennett has gone further than simply criticising Qatar diplomatically. Reporting on his campaign positions indicates that he has contemplated military action if necessary as part of a broader effort to dismantle Hamas and its external support network. He has also proposed removing Qatar and Turkey from roles in Gaza and transferring some of their functions to Egypt.
That is significant because Qatar has played an important diplomatic role in negotiations involving Hamas and has hosted the group’s political leadership. The possibility of an Israeli government taking a much harder line against Doha therefore raises questions about whether the confrontation could extend beyond Gaza.
Israel has already demonstrated that its campaign against Hamas is capable of reaching outside the Gaza Strip. In September 2025, Israel carried out a strike in Doha targeting Hamas leaders, an operation that Qatar condemned as an attack on its sovereignty.
Consequently, the political debate in Israel is not simply about whether the country should continue fighting Hamas. It is increasingly about what methods should be used, how far Israel should go and how aggressively it should confront Hamas’s regional network.
For Israel’s enemies, therefore, Netanyahu losing power could potentially be a case of moving from the frying pan into the fire.
A successor could conclude that Netanyahu was too slow, too politically constrained or too cautious in pursuing Israel’s security objectives. Rather than scaling back Israel’s confrontation with Hamas, such a leader could attempt to demonstrate greater resolve through military operations, intelligence actions, diplomatic pressure and efforts to target Hamas’s leadership and support network outside Gaza.
This does not mean every Netanyahu challenger would automatically launch a wider regional war. Political campaign rhetoric is not the same thing as government policy, and any future Israeli government would face enormous military, diplomatic and international constraints.
But the broader point remains: Netanyahu is replaceable; Israel’s security concerns are not.
The coming political transition could therefore change Israel’s leadership without fundamentally changing its strategic direction.
The real question may not be whether Israel becomes less aggressive after Netanyahu. It may be whether the person who replaces him believes Bibi simply did not go far enough.
And if that happens, Israel’s enemies could discover that the departure of Netanyahu was not the end of the confrontation they feared—but the beginning of an even more uncompromising chapter.
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