Makinde’s Naira Makes Noise Because It Works — Unlike the Silent Loans of Yesterday.
How Oyo’s Debt Story Changed (2018–2025): What Ajimobi Borrowed, What Makinde Did — and Why It Matters Now
From N90bn Claim to N500bn Row — The Real Story of Oyo State’s Debt and the Two Governors Who Shaped It
Oyo State’s public finances have been a recurring headline in southern Nigerian newsrooms for much of the last decade. Between the outgoing administration of Senator Abiola Ajimobi (2011–2019) and the incumbent Governor Seyi Makinde (2019–present), arguments about how much the state owed, what it borrowed for, and whether the borrowing was prudent have shaped political debate — and policy. This piece unpacks the publicly available records and reporting from 2018 through mid-2025, explains key differences in approach between the two administrations, and highlights why the debate still matters for taxpayers, investors and Oyo’s political future.
The numbers problem: why there’s confusion
One reason the Oyo debt story is messy is that different actors cite different sources and different cut-off dates. Governors and political appointees often reference internal figures while national agencies such as the Debt Management Office (DMO) and the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) publish periodic snapshots that use specific reporting dates. That means a figure quoted for “the state’s debt” can vary depending on whether it’s domestic debt only, includes external loans, or captures liabilities recorded after a reporting cut-off. Fact-checking outlets have pointed out these discrepancies repeatedly.
Where Oyo stood around 2018–2019
Publicly available DMO-derived figures show Oyo’s domestic debt as trending upwards by the end of 2018. One widely reported snapshot placed Oyo’s domestic debt at roughly N91.5 billion as at December 31, 2018. That ranking made Oyo one of the states with sizable subnational debt but still short of the alarmist headlines that followed.
When Governor Makinde assumed office in May 2019 he publicly claimed he inherited debts that were higher than figures previously stated by Ajimobi’s team — citing numbers such as N150 billion (a figure Makinde used in media appearances). That triggered pushback from Ajimobi’s camp and fact-checkers: the DMO/NBS reconciliations that were later cited suggested total public debt figures closer to N126 billion (when domestic and some external liabilities were combined) for the March 31, 2019 cut-off — lower than Makinde’s public claim but higher than the N90bn figure Ajimobi allies advanced. The upshot: both administrations relied on different baselines to make competing political points.
What Ajimobi did: borrowing profile (2011–2019)
Ajimobi’s two terms were characterized by a mix of capital projects and expanded revenue drives. Reporters and commentators documented a pattern of raising domestic loans and, according to government statements at the time, borrowing for roadworks, infrastructure, and public amenities. Ajimobi’s supporters argued these loans were investments that improved the state’s asset base and generated economic activity; critics said the projects were sometimes poorly prioritized and that transparency on loan terms and how proceeds were spent was weak.
Independent reporting summarized the political narrative: Ajimobi’s administration borrowed during a period of falling federal allocations to states and used a combination of domestic borrowing instruments to finance capital works. Later political opponents and successors would portray that borrowing as a reason the state “started” the Makinde era with a heavy repayment burden. The contested numbers (N90bn vs. N150bn vs. other amounts) mostly stem from whether one counts domestic only, domestic plus external, or includes contingent liabilities and unpaid bills.
What Makinde did differently (2019–2025)
Governor Makinde’s stewardship of Oyo State’s finances shows several notable differences in approach — in policy emphasis, debt management and public communication:
1. Greater public visibility and rhetorical framing. Makinde repeatedly foregrounded inherited liabilities as a reason for fiscal reforms and revenue mobilization campaigns, using higher aggregate debt figures to justify austerity in some budget line items and prioritization of projects. This framing also served political aims — explaining cuts and reorders to constituencies used to Ajimobi-era projects. The use of different debt totals in public statements catalyzed the debate and drove calls for public accounting reconciliation.
2. Targeted revenue mobilization and claims of reduction. The Makinde administration has highlighted steps to increase internally generated revenue (IGR) and, in public communications, claimed reductions in net debt at points — with reports in 2021 suggesting a reduction of about N7.4 billion in the state’s debt profile over a two-year period. Whether those reductions reflect net new repayments, reclassification of liabilities, or accounting adjustments varies by reporting source, but the administration has used these figures to argue for a stabilizing fiscal path.
3. Continued borrowing for capital and renovation plans. Despite rhetoric about prudent management, Governor Makinde’s government has not shied away from new capital programs — and that has sometimes translated into fresh borrowing or plans that raise public scrutiny. For example, a 2025 proposal to renovate the Agodi Government House (reported cost ~N63.5 billion) drew sharp public reaction and renewed questions about borrowing priorities versus social services — a debate mirrored in other states where large capital renovations provoked pushback.
4. Allegations and counter-claims about scale of borrowing up to 2025. Political critics and some commentators escalated accusations in 2024–2025 that Makinde’s administration borrowed heavily — with one claim circulating that the total debt had swollen toward “over N500 billion” between 2019 and 2025. At present, that figure appears to come from partisan commentary and aggregate claims rather than a single DMO-verified public release; it therefore requires careful validation against DMO and state-published accounts. Still, the controversy has become a central talking point in local politics.
Why the differences matter (policy and politics)
Investment vs. sustainability trade-off. Ajimobi’s borrowing was defended as necessary infrastructure investment during tighter federal transfers; Makinde’s borrowing, while also invested in capital projects, has been criticized when projects seem costly or politically symbolic (e.g., high-price renovations). The fiscal calculus for states is always a balance between leveraging debt to crowd in development versus compromising future budgets through debt servicing.
Transparency and confidence. Recurrent swings in public numbers — and competing claims from former and incumbent administrations — undermine investor and citizen confidence. If the DMO and the state can produce reconciled, regularly updated public debt schedules (domestic, external, contingent liabilities, and arrears), it would reduce political noise and help markets price Oyo State risk more accurately.
Political weaponization. Debt figures are politically potent. Each administration has used debt narratives to explain policy choices or to attack predecessors. That politicization can slow the technical reforms needed for long-term fiscal health (e.g., debt management units, public procurement transparency, and IGR reforms).
What to watch (next 12–24 months)
1. Official reconciliations from the Debt Management Office and Oyo State — a clear, dated DMO table that tracks Oyo’s domestic and external debt up to the most recent quarter would settle many disputes. Fact-checkers and national outlets will watch for this.
2. Budget documents and audited financial statements from the Oyo State Accountant-General — which should show how borrowed funds were used and how repayments were scheduled.
3. Any new large contracts or renovation approvals (government house, capital projects) that may require fresh financing — these will be focal points for public debate and may provoke votes in the State Assembly or legal challenges.
Bottom line: read the fine print, not the headlines
The headline figures you see — whether N90bn, N126bn, N150bn, N178bn or far larger claims made in political commentary — often reflect different accounting windows or inclusions/exclusions (domestic vs. external vs. arrears). Ajimobi’s era saw significant borrowing tied to capital projects during constrained federal transfers; Makinde has mixed aggressive revenue rhetoric with both repayments and fresh capital commitments, which has produced claims of both reductions and expansions in the debt profile depending on who’s speaking.
For citizens, investors, and analysts, the practical takeaway is simple: demand dated, reconciled debt tables (from the DMO and the State Accountant-General), insist on project-level disclosure of what loans financed, and evaluate both administrations by whether borrowing improved productive capacity and revenue-generating assets — not just by political soundbites.
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