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Electoral Reform or Electoral Scam? How Nigerian Politicians Are Preparing Their 2027 Heist

Bad Leadership, Weak Laws, and a Compromised Referee: How Nigeria’s Political Class Is Undermining Electoral Reform and Democratic Growth

For years, a popular argument has echoed across Nigeria’s political discourse: “The followers are worse than the leaders.” It is often said casually, sometimes angrily, and frequently as a way to excuse those in power from responsibility. But that argument collapses under serious scrutiny. If we are being honest—brutally honest—the cornerstone of Nigeria’s prolonged setbacks, systemic weakness, democratic erosion, and underdevelopment is leadership. Not the citizens. Not the electorate. Not the so-called followers. The real problem lies squarely with those who seek, occupy, and manipulate leadership positions for personal and partisan gain.

Yes, leadership is the problem. It has always been.

It is the political class—those contesting elections, defecting without consequence, undermining institutions, and rewriting rules to suit their ambitions—that has consistently dragged the country back into the doldrums. And nowhere is this more evident than in the ongoing conversations and silent maneuvers around Nigeria’s electoral reform process, particularly the role of the National Assembly and the fate of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC).

As Nigerians look ahead to 2027, the fear is no longer abstract. It is grounded in history, pattern, and evidence.


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Strong Institutions, Strong Societies: The Principle Nigeria Knows but Refuses to Practice

Political science and governance studies across the world agree on one fundamental truth: strong institutions are the backbone of strong societies. Nations that have achieved sustainable development, political stability, and democratic consolidation did so not because their leaders were saints, but because institutions were deliberately strengthened to outlive individual ambitions.

Nigeria knows this principle. We quote it often. We teach it in classrooms. We reference it in policy documents. Yet, in practice, we sabotage it at every critical opportunity.

INEC, as Nigeria’s electoral umpire, is one of the most important democratic institutions in the country. Since the advent of the Fourth Republic in 1999, INEC has followed a trajectory—slow, uneven, but real—of gradual reform and institutional improvement. From voter registration upgrades to the introduction of technology such as the Permanent Voter Card (PVC), BVAS, and electronic transmission frameworks, there has been measurable progress.

This is precisely why the current phase of electoral reform matters so much.

Rather than weakening INEC, this moment should be used to consolidate reforms, close legal loopholes, strengthen enforcement powers, and respond to long-standing demands from citizens, civil society organizations, election observers, and democracy advocates.

But that is not what Nigerians are seeing.


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Electoral Reform or Electoral Regression?

The big question Nigerians should be asking is simple but uncomfortable:
What exactly is the Senate preparing to do with electoral reform?

Is the aim to deepen democracy—or to make elections easier to manipulate?

Key issues have remained unresolved for years, yet they are conveniently ignored whenever electoral amendments are discussed:

What is INEC doing to strengthen internal democracy within political parties?

What legal mechanisms exist to curb reckless decamping by elected officials?

What is being done about the proliferation of weak, unviable political parties?

How are party primaries regulated to prevent godfatherism and imposition of candidates?


The honest answer is uncomfortable: very little is being done, not because solutions are unknown, but because political interests stand in the way.

INEC itself understands these problems. It has, at different times, proposed amendments, reforms, and recommendations based on its experience administering elections. Yet, many of these proposals die quietly at the National Assembly. Why? Because INEC, in its current structure, remains politically constrained—an institution that is legally independent but practically vulnerable to executive and legislative interference.

The ruling political elite has little incentive to empower an incorruptible, fully autonomous electoral umpire. A strong INEC, fortified by airtight laws, would reduce manipulation, close rigging loopholes, and limit post-election judicial gymnastics. That reality does not favor politicians who thrive in chaos.


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Decamping: A Symptom of Weak Laws, Not Political Freedom

One of the clearest signs of institutional failure in Nigeria’s democracy is the culture of unchecked political decamping. Governors, lawmakers, and high-ranking officials routinely switch parties mid-term, often without ideological justification and always without consequences.

In a functioning democracy with strong institutions, this would not happen.

If Nigeria had firm, unambiguous laws, every elected official who defects from the party on whose platform they were elected would automatically lose their seat, except under clearly defined and verifiable circumstances such as party merger or proven internal division.

Instead, decamping has become a strategic weapon—used to consolidate power, weaken opposition, and manipulate electoral outcomes ahead of future contests.

There are no penalties. No deterrents. No accountability.

This is not political freedom; it is political lawlessness enabled by weak institutions.

If the law were properly framed and enforced, decamping would carry consequences. Sanctions should exist. Loss of seat should be automatic. Internal party disputes should be resolved through established legal and institutional channels, not opportunistic party hopping.


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Internal Party Democracy: The Missing Link

Political parties are the foundation of representative democracy. When parties are weak, corrupt, or internally undemocratic, the entire political system collapses from within.

Yet, in Nigeria, party primaries are often the least democratic stage of the electoral process. Candidates are handpicked. Delegates are manipulated. Results are written before votes are cast. Godfathers determine outcomes behind closed doors.

This is unacceptable.

Electoral reform should explicitly outlaw candidate imposition. Party primaries must be transparent, competitive, and member-driven. Direct primaries, where verified party members vote for candidates, should be entrenched in law as the standard—not an option that parties can discard when it becomes inconvenient.

Internal party democracy cannot be left to goodwill. It must be enforced by law, monitored by INEC, and backed by clear sanctions.


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Politics Without Principle: Why Ideology Matters

Another consequence of weak regulation is the complete erosion of ideology in Nigerian politics. Politicians move from party to party without any contradiction in beliefs, policies, or values—because, in truth, ideology rarely matters.

This culture must end.

Any politician who has contested, aspired, or held office under a political party should be legally restrained from decamping at will. Laws should encourage politics of principle, consistency, and accountability. If an individual chooses to defect despite these safeguards, there should be consequences—including disqualification from contesting elections in the next electoral cycle.

Such measures are not punitive; they are corrective. They force politicians to build parties, resolve internal disputes, and stand by their convictions.


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What the National Assembly Should Be Doing

This is what serious electoral reform looks like. This is what the National Assembly should be debating, refining, and legislating.

Not subtle amendments designed to weaken INEC.
Not legal ambiguities that create loopholes for 2027.
Not reforms that prioritize political survival over democratic integrity.

Yet, the pattern suggests otherwise.

Many Nigerians rightly fear that the current legislative approach to electoral reform is less about strengthening democracy and more about creating a soft landing for those in power ahead of the next general elections.


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Leadership, Not Followership, Is the Problem

It bears repeating: Nigeria’s crisis is not a crisis of followership. Citizens vote. Citizens protest. Citizens engage. Citizens demand accountability.

The failure lies with leadership—self-serving, short-sighted, and deeply resistant to institutional strength. A political class that fears strong laws, strong referees, and strong accountability cannot deliver development.

Until leadership changes its attitude toward institutions like INEC, until electoral laws prioritize democracy over dominance, and until consequences replace impunity, Nigeria will continue to recycle the same problems under different political slogans.

The truth is simple, even if it is uncomfortable:
Our leadership is bad. Not our people.

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