Before Biafra, the North Wanted Out — Britain Shut It Down.
1966: The Year the North Almost Walked Away — Hassan Katsina, British Pressure, and the Oil Logic That Saved (and Trapped) Nigeria
There are moments in a nation’s history that are deliberately buried — not because they are unimportant, but because they are too revealing. They expose uncomfortable truths about power, fear, foreign influence, and the real forces that shape national survival.
One such moment occurred in 1966, in the aftermath of Nigeria’s first military coup and its bloody counter-coup.
Popular history teaches Nigerians that the country nearly broke apart because of the Eastern Region and the events that eventually led to the Biafran War. What is far less discussed — and far more politically inconvenient — is this:
Nigeria nearly disintegrated first from the North.
And at the centre of that moment stood a man whose name history has deliberately softened into the background:
General Hassan Usman Katsina.
A Sandhurst-trained officer.
A northern royal prince.
A figure trusted by the Northern establishment.
A man carefully observed by British power brokers.
In 1966, Hassan Katsina was not a footnote. He was a pivot.
The Collapse of Trust After January 1966
To understand how close Nigeria came to northern secession, one must revisit the psychological and political trauma unleashed by the January 15, 1966 coup.
The coup — though later framed as ideological or reformist — was perceived in the North as ethnically selective. Key Northern political leaders and senior military officers were assassinated, while many Igbo officers survived. This perception, whether fully accurate or not, hardened rapidly into belief.
The situation worsened when Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, having assumed power, promulgated Decree No. 34, abolishing Nigeria’s federal structure in favour of a unitary system.
For the North, this was not administrative reform.
It was existential threat.
Federalism was the North’s insurance policy — a system that allowed a culturally diverse, demographically vast region to retain autonomy within Nigeria. Unification was seen as an attempt to centralize power in Lagos and dismantle northern political leverage.
By mid-1966, resentment had turned into rage.
The July Counter-Coup and a Leaderless Nation
The July 29, 1966 counter-coup did not simply remove Ironsi. It shattered what little cohesion remained in the Nigerian state.
Ironsi was killed.
Senior officers were murdered.
The military fractured along regional lines.
For a brief but extremely dangerous period, Nigeria had no clear authority.
Inside northern military and political circles, a question that had never been seriously entertained before was now openly discussed:
Why should the North remain in Nigeria at all?
This was not rhetorical bravado. It was strategic calculation.
Many northern officers believed:
The federation had become unstable beyond repair
The North had the population, land, and internal cohesion to survive independently
Continued unity exposed the region to endless southern political crises
This discussion moved quickly from theory to planning.
And this is where Hassan Katsina becomes unavoidable.
Hassan Katsina: Power, Pedigree, and Authority
In 1966, Hassan Katsina was uniquely positioned.
He was:
A graduate of Sandhurst, trained in British military doctrine
Of royal northern lineage, respected by emirs and aristocrats
A senior officer with authority over Northern military formations
A bridge between traditional northern power and modern military command
Most importantly, he was trusted.
If Katsina had endorsed northern withdrawal from Nigeria, resistance would have been minimal. The North had leadership, legitimacy, and armed capacity.
This is not speculation.
A flag was reportedly prepared — a symbolic but serious act signalling intent to announce a new Northern state.
That is how far the process went.
This was not casual talk in barracks.
This was preparation for secession.
British Intervention: Not Sentiment, But Strategy
What halted the process was not sudden patriotism.
It was British intervention.
And it must be stated clearly: Britain did not intervene to “save Nigeria” out of moral concern. Britain intervened to protect its strategic and economic interests, especially oil.
By 1966:
British firms were deeply embedded in Nigerian oil production
Nigeria was emerging as one of Britain’s most important post-colonial energy suppliers
Fragmentation threatened contracts, concessions, and geopolitical influence
A divided Nigeria meant:
Competing governments
Renegotiated oil rights
Potential Soviet or rival Western influence
Regional instability across West Africa
Britain wanted one Nigeria, not because unity was virtuous, but because unity was manageable.
The Men Who Applied the Pressure
British pressure was not abstract. It was executed by specific individuals and institutions.
Sir Francis Cumming-Bruce
British High Commissioner to Nigeria
Cumming-Bruce was Britain’s most senior representative in Lagos. His role went far beyond diplomacy. He was tasked with stabilizing Nigeria in Britain’s favour.
He made Britain’s position unmistakably clear to Nigerian military leaders:
No recognition of any secession
No diplomatic legitimacy
No access to international financial systems Britain influenced
Harold Wilson
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
Wilson’s Labour government adopted a firm policy: Nigeria must remain intact. His administration viewed Nigerian unity as essential to Britain’s post-imperial relevance in Africa.
George Brown
Foreign Secretary
Under Brown, the British Foreign Office explicitly supported any Nigerian leadership capable of preserving the federation — regardless of internal politics.
First Ironsi.
Then Gowon.
Always one Nigeria.
The British Foreign Office (Whitehall)
Whitehall understood something Nigerian officers did not yet fully grasp:
Oil would define Nigeria’s future.
Fragmentation would turn oil into a battlefield — legal, diplomatic, and possibly military.
What Britain Told Katsina — Plainly
The British message to Hassan Katsina and the northern leadership was blunt:
A breakaway North would not be recognized
International legitimacy would be denied
Oil revenues would be contested
Economic isolation would follow
Northern survival would be jeopardized
Britain understood leverage.
And Britain made it clear that oil — not ideology — would determine outcomes.
Katsina listened.
He calculated.
And he stopped.
The flag was never raised.
The Gowon Compromise
Out of this dangerous vacuum emerged General Yakubu Gowon.
Gowon was acceptable because:
He was northern, but non-radical
He lacked deep ethnic antagonisms
He projected moderation
He represented continuity
For Britain, Gowon was ideal.
He offered:
Stability
A single command structure
A unified negotiating partner
Preservation of oil arrangements
Gowon became the face of Nigerian unity — not because he was inevitable, but because he was useful.
The Uncomfortable Truth Nigerians Must Confront
Nigeria’s unity was not preserved by destiny.
It was preserved by:
Fear
Power calculations
Foreign diplomacy
Oil economics
In 1966, Nigeria nearly collapsed from the North, not the East.
Hassan Katsina stood at the threshold of history — and chose restraint under external pressure.
Until Nigerians understand how foreign powers shaped these decisions — quietly, strategically, and decisively — the country will continue to misunderstand its own fragility.
Britain did not rule Nigeria with guns in 1966.
It ruled with:
Diplomatic leverage
Control of legitimacy
Oil calculations
Strategic pressure
That is the reality.
That is the history.
And that is the truth Nigerians must finally confront.
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